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Abstract. This article focuses on discursive regularities that can generally be observed 
in text corpora produced in similar communication situations (medical interviews, 
political debates, teaching classes, etc.). One type of such regularities is related to the 
so-called ‘discourse genres’, considered as a set of tacit instructions broadly constraining 
the forms of utterances in a given discursive practice. Those regularities highlight 
the relatively regulated, non-random nature of most of our discursive practices and 
epitomize the necessary constrained creativity of meaning making in discourse. In this 
perspective, we suggest that the concepts of Thirdness and Habit, as theorized by Charles 
S. Peirce, can be fruitful in describing the role and importance of such regularities in our 
sociodiscursive life. More specifically, we believe that discourse regularities are ideal case 
studies if one wishes to investigate instances of predictability in semiotic (discursive) 
processes. Overall, we suggest that their study can be one of many research orientations 
through which a prediction-based scientific conception of semiotics could be applied.
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Introduction
“Semiotic (un)predictability” was the main theme of the 2015 Tartu Summer School of 
Semiotics, one of the reasons being that “the paradoxical co-presence of predictability 
and unpredictability is a fundamental aspect of the dynamics of the semiotic world”.1 
Regarding discursive practices more particularly, the very notion of predictability, 
1 See the original “Call for participance” of the Tartu Summer School of Semiotics 2015, 
available at: http://www.fl fi .ut.ee/summer_school/2015/index.html. 
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although not often employed in discourse analysis, is indeed relevant when defining 
and characterizing salient features of our daily discursive performances. In this 
endeavour, we believe that Charles S. Peirce’s theory of signs is a fruitful framework if 
one wishes to make better sense philosophically and analytically of (1) how we both 
produce and interpret oral or written texts; and (2) how predictability and regularities, 
considered in our case as natural corollaries of discursive habits crystallized in text 
corpora, are “fundamental aspect[s] of the dynamics of the semiotic world”. This article 
proposes to explore briefly how some aspects of Peirce’s theory of signs could apply to 
the problem of discursive predictability.
1. Peirce’s phenomenological categories: a brief reminder
Adopting a Peircean perspective to scrutinize instances of semiotic predictability 
involves grappling, at one stage or other of the enquiry, with the philosopher’s categories 
of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness – if only because a pertinent apprehension and 
proper understanding of meaning-making phenomena cannot evacuate the problem 
of their phenomenological grounding.
Those three irreducible categories, at the basis of Peirce’s new kind of phenomeno-
logy (i.e. phaneroscopy), simply refer to three “modes of being” as experienced by 
human subjects. In that sense, the most obvious mode would be that of Secondness, 
understood as the category of the particular, the actual or the existent: it is the category of 
the concrete world we live in, the one that is precisely described and explained by science. 
Secondness is the experience of force and resistance: it points to the fact that we cannot 
walk through walls, that if we put our hand in boiling water, we will burn our fingers and 
instantly remove our hand, or that if we hear a screeching sound, we will want to cover 
our ears. Nevertheless, our experience cannot only be that of the concrete, physically 
resistant world of the philosophical “materialists”: “Materialism, as a theory, insists there 
is no universe but the universe of Secondness. Materialism (and nominalism) is not 
wrong, according to Peirce, it is just not the whole story” (Gilmore 2006: 312). Two other 
categories are indeed necessary to make sense of “all that is in any way or in any sense 
present to time to the mind” (CP 1.284): besides being confronted by existent objects of 
the concrete material world, we also experience real objects which, although we cannot 
see them as we see existing objects (e.g. a Second like a house, a tree, a cell, etc.), play a 
seminal role in our daily life in influencing our thought and conduct. While existence is 
related to Secondness, reality is also related to both Firstness and Thirdness.
More precisely, Firstness refers to “the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else” (Short 2007: 75): as pure qualities 
(represented by generals such as ‘redness’, ‘softness’, etc.), Firsts are conceived as 
 Discourse genres as determiners of discursive regularities  357
abstracted possibilities that can be actualized in existent objects (i.e. Seconds) to the 
extent to which “any such [pure] quality has to be prescinded […] from the fact of its 
occurring or being embodied. For the fact – that the scarlet is in the tunic or that the 
whistle occurred now, breaking in on my thought – involves a relation to something 
else” (Short 2007: 78). As such, pure qualities are thus real but not existent or actual: 
“[a]nything actual is some possibility actualized. We never encounter quality except as 
occurring, yet it is not reducible to its occurring. […] When we abstract the quality from 
its occurrence […] we abstract the possibility from its actualization” (Short 2007: 78). 
Finally, Thirdness is the mode of being of the relationships between existent 
particulars. Indeed, “[as] the categories of [Firstness] and [Secondness] do not capture 
the aspect of experience in which we apprehend continuity, generality, and law, they do 
not account for our knowledge or seeming knowledge of physical bodies, dispositions, 
living bodies, organic functions, persons, personalities, and social organizations” 
(Short 2007: 80), that is to say the experience of what Peirce called the “personality” 
of things, whether existent or imaginary objects. Thirdness is indeed “the experience 
of seeing beyond the merely reactive Seconds and perceiving the relations between 
things, especially in terms of where they are headed” (Gilmore 2006: 312). Like Firsts, 
Thirds are real and attained through representations, having to be instantiated in 
Secondness to be experienced physically: as such, “Thirdness has the character of 
the mental, which is to say, relationships are understood, they are not literally seen” 
(Gilmore 2006: 311). An example of a Third would be gravity: no one can see it but we 
can feel its predicted “power” over us through the particular instances it actualizes in 
Secondness. All in all, “[the] universe of Thirdness is the universe of general laws, the 
universe of signs that indicate the adoption of a habit, of habit-taking” (Gilmore 2006: 
310), which can either be natural or man-made, so that “any statement of law, whether 
a law of nature or a law instituted by men, entails subjunctive and counterfactual 
conditions: were a stone to be released here, it would fall; had a dozen benighted souls 
sworn the solemn oaths, our club would have had that many more members” (Short 
2007: 79). The metaphor of the musical melody – as a Third – is particularly suited to 
differentiate between Secondness and Thirdness:
As Peirce remarks, a piece of music has two basic components, the individual 
notes and the “air” or melody. We experience an individual note in an instant and 
immediately. The air, however, we can experience only over time and mediately. 
We can only hear the air by hearing the separate notes: the two are inseparable, but 
we have to be listening to something else in the notes, something more than just 
the individual notes, to hear the melody. […] Peirce insists that the melody is real, 
incomplete, but ongoing and we can, with work and concentration, say something 
about it, how it goes and how it may develop in the future. […] To pay attention 
to the personalities of things, to listen for their melodies, is, first of all, to feel their 
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Secondness, and then reason one’s way through deductions and inductions, to a 
clear and distinct conception of their Secondness. But, then, one must be attentive 
to and feel their Thirdness, feel the continuity and the dispositions that direct 
their emanations of influence, and reason one’s way to a clear and more distinct 
conception of this Thirdness. (Gilmore 2006: 317) 
Accordingly, the world of Secondness is saturated with Thirdness: any Second entity 
has a so-called personality, i.e. a disposition to react and behave in a certain context, 
guided as it is by a habit or law, yet which enjoys reality by governing actual and 
expected reactions. It is important to note then that reality “is enjoyed by laws that have 
no here-and-now existence [...]. At the same time, there would be no reality without 
existence. For we call no represented law real if it does not govern actual reactions” 
(Short 2007: 87). Finally, technically speaking, Thirdness is best exemplified in the 
process of semiosis itself which, as an instituted triadic relation between a Sign, an 
Object and its Interpretant, has the character of a law: 
We have considered the relation established between a Sign and its Object 
[as mediated by way of the Interpretant] as a social institution, having all its 
characteristics: it is relative to a community and fulfills a certain number of social 
functions for this community (functionality of the institution), notably social 
communication, be it mass communication or interpersonal communication; 
like any institution, it has a contingent aspect and an aspect of permanence and 
stability. (Marty 1990: 292; my translation, J. G.)
Thus interpretation itself is the actualization of contextualized rules determining 
adequate interpretants to be generated. In that sense, interpreting a particular 
communicative situation also requires the actualization of particular stabilized 
complexes of (linguistic) signs to be recognized and then interpreted by speakers. 
In this perspective, we suggest that the discursive regularities observed in corpora of 
(oral or written) texts having been produced in similar communication situations (e.g. 
medical interviews, political debates, teaching classes, etc.) point to real discursive 
“melodies” that can be typified beyond the mere individual notes of the dispersed, 
existent utterances they are instantiated through. In the following section, we describe 
how discourse genres can therefore be re-interpreted as Thirds.
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2. Discourse genres as Thirds
While literary scholars very early described so-called literary genres by sets of 
criteria qualifying their constraints on linguistic processes, researchers now strive to 
expand those enquiries to non-artistic discursive productions of our daily life. They 
acknowledge that for any given communication situation, defined as a spatiotemporal 
setting in which the linguistic signs were/are meant to be interpreted, the speakers 
always expect a particular genre to be enacted and recognized, following which they 
will adequately both produce and interpret subsequent utterances. In agreement 
with the French discourse analyst Charaudeau (2014: 49), we thus understand that 
the constraints of the communication situation “give discursive instructions to the 
enunciation and reception instances so that the latter can stage and interpret the 
speech acts” (my translation, J. G.). Charaudeau adds that “it is these discursive 
instructions that assure a part of the mutual understanding of speech acts and preside 
over the regularity of the ways of speaking, below the possible variants due to various 
psychological and social factors: following this hypothesis, this is how speech genres 
are born” (my translation, J. G.). In the same vein, according to Bakhtin (1986[1952–
53]: 79), one of those first scholars to have broadened genre analysis beyond the 
literary sphere, “if speech genres did not exist and we had not mastered them, if we 
had to originate them during the speech process and construct each utterance at will 
for the first time, speech communication would be almost impossible”.
Accordingly, and in light of Peirce’s conception of Thirdness, we believe that 
discourse genres, considered here as a set of tacit instructions broadly constraining 
the form and content of utterances in given discursive practices, can be considered as 
Thirds, understood as real habits exerting an influence on our everyday discourse: if 
discourse genres do lack concrete existence (we cannot see them), they are nevertheless 
instantiated through particular (oral or written) linguistic productions, presiding over 
their formation. Bakhtin (1986[1952–53]: 80), again, suggested that:
[…] a speaker is given not only mandatory forms of the national language (lexical 
composition and grammatical structure), but also forms of utterances that are 
mandatory, that is, speech genres. […] Speech genres are much more changeable, 
flexible, and plastic than language forms are, but they have a normative significance 
for the speaking individuum, and they are not created by him but are given to 
him. Therefore, the single utterance, with all its individuality and creativity, can 
in no way be regarded as a completely free combination of forms of language, as is 
supposed, for example, by Saussure (and by many other linguists after him) […].
So, just as “the reality of words consists, according to Peirce, precisely in their relatively 
stable significations (the interpretative habits attached to words)” (Johansen 1993: 
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168), the reality of genres consists in the constraints they operate on the production of 
observable utterances, i.e. the productive habits they entail. Accordingly, the discursive 
regularities or patterns one can detect in collections of texts emanating from similar 
communication situations do highlight the relatively regulated, non-random nature 
of most of our discursive practices, epitomize the necessary constrained creativity 
of meaning-making and, more interestingly, confirm the influence of such discourse 
genres over-determining the content and form of utterances. 
3. Discursive predictability?
Luckmann (2014[1985]: 352; my emphasis, J. G.) already considered that:
[…] there are indeed, in all societies, communicative actions in which participants 
do in fact, during the process of conception, orientate themselves towards an 
overall pattern as the means that serves their ends. This pattern largely determines 
the selection of different elements from the communicative ‘code’ and thus the 
progress of the action is, in terms of the elements determined by the pattern, 
relatively predictable. If such patterns are available and part of the social stock 
of knowledge, and if they are typically recognizable in concrete communicative 
actions, then we should speak of communicative genres.
If we come indeed to believe that discourse genres (or communicative genres in 
Luckmann’s terms), as habits pertaining to particular communication situations, 
regulate in one way or another our linguistic productions (as evinced by the regularities 
that can be detected in similar contexts), it entails that they could also theoretically be 
conceived as a determiner of observable predictions.
Obviously, one type of semiotic behaviour that can easily be observed might be 
one regulated by traffic codes. In this case, energetic interpretants – if one follows 
Peirce’s trichotomy of emotional, energetic and logical interpretants – can easily be 
empirically observed and statistically apprehended: such observations  (technically 
speaking and according to Peirce’s categories, the observed material is composed of 
‘sinsigns’, in all their empirical ‘haecceity’) can result in calculating the mean x and 
standard deviation z of the number of drivers who stop their car at a red light, who 
turn left when a sign forbids them doing so, who park in an appropriate place, etc. 
which can be used afterwards for future predictive modelling. Moreover, given the high 
social and physical costs implied by the traffic code as a sign system (e.g. the risk of 
a lethal accident if one breaks the rules, the fines incurred if one breaks the law, etc.), 
our semiotic behaviour has become so crystallized that one can rely on predictions 
enjoying a high probability of occurrence.
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However, as far as discursive practices are concerned, observing and predicting 
which logical interpretants (e.g. symbolic signs) will exactly be generated in a given 
context is an outright impossible task. Firstly, observing and coding linguistic behaviour 
in real time is impractical: as conversation analysts know, one must necessarily rely 
on recording instruments or post hoc textual corpora in order to scrutinize any given 
material at a proper reflexive pace. Secondly, and more fundamentally, as man-made 
discourse-generic habits constraining discourse formation are context-dependent, they 
are not as firmly crystallized as natural laws pertaining to chemistry for instance, 
or as linguistic habits constricting grammatical formation. As far as discourse is 
concerned, a total prediction is semiotically inconceivable since there is always room 
for dynamic creativity: we can consciously and individually unravel the habits relative 
to each particular contextualized setting that might be considered, as is most notably 
the case in special artistic contexts as well as in loose conversational ones. It is always 
possible, whether consciously or unconsciously, to “break the situational frame”, as 
Erving Goffman would say (see Goffman 1974, for instance), and go against the 
discourse-generic norms, which, needless to say, nevertheless entails problematic social 
consequences. Moreover, as Peirce also remarked, since “a prediction is essentially of 
a general nature, [it] cannot ever be completely fulfilled” (CP 1.26): we can only talk 
of a ‘disposition’ or a ‘tendency’ of future events to conform to a given general rule.
This being said, making relative predictions regarding particular generic patterns 
linked to precise and highly formalized communication situations does not seem out of 
reach: after all, we all make unconscious predictions when interacting in a given social 
context. And, as we have suggested earlier, the discursive regularities emanating from 
corpora of compared texts belonging to similar communicative situations do point to 
more or less crystallized, situational habits that we suggested must have necessarily 
emerged in comparable contexts. Considered as a determiner of generic regularities 
(when it comes to repeated segments, expressions and syntactic structures, the use of 
clichéd and stereotypical constructions, etc.), the communication situation becomes a 
key factor to consider and determine if one wishes to predict patterned actualizations 
of a hypothesized genre. 
According to Peirce, the role of purpose is seminal in every semiotic process because 
“semiosis occurs in a context, that context being one of purposefulness” (Short 2007: 
158). Besides, “[m]any, if not all instances, of purposeful behaviour have dual bases: a 
general rule (instinct, habit, custom, thought) and an occasion for applying that rule” 
(Short 2007: 155). In our case, the communication situation is then considered as this 
“occasion for applying that rule” (i.e. a discourse genre) one postulates and expects 
to see being brought into play, always according to the communicative purposes at 
stake. In Peircean terms, we might say then that collateral observation and collateral 
experience of previous communication situations are thus required to trigger adequate 
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actualizations of context-specific genres; in those interpretative circumstances, 
abductive inferences are typically applied.
In the end, purpose-related discourse genres are fundamental for meaning-making 
processes because they control both the production and interpretation of the particular 
utterances they shape: recognizing those as belonging to specific genres direct the 
determination of final interpretants, understood as “stably formed habits that govern 
interpretations and actions within a given culture. […] Final interpretants in this sense 
are vital to the survival of society, and to the sanity of individuals, because unless 
its members agree on the interpretation of a great many sign systems, society will 
disintegrate and eventually collapse, and if individuals are unable to form habits they 
go insane” (Johansen 1993: 341), no less.
4. A brief illustration
Like any other everyday life material, the online texts presenting universities instantiate 
a specific (promotional) “way of speaking”. In this case, the given communication 
situation is defined as a computer-mediated arrangement through which institutional 
writers, as a collective entity, propose to present and promote an academic institution 
as a whole to predefined publics (future students, actual students, personnel, 
researchers, potential donors, governmental actors, corporations, etc.) via the web. 
Consequently, according to the interpretative habits and the collateral experience 
of analogous past situations they have integrated, the addressees expect a particular 
discourse genre to be enacted and recognized, following which they will interpret and 
correctly comprehend the communicative purpose of those (mainly descriptive) texts. 
We suggested elsewhere that the particular discourse genre “associated with this type of 
online discursive activity – which concerns any organisation presented online, not only 
universities – can be paralleled with that of the paper promotional brochure presenting 
organisations; its numeric nature does not change the basic, generic characteristics 
present in traditional brochures” (Gaspard 2015: 559). Relying on a corpus comprising 
a selection of such texts, it is then possible to detect, describe and analyse the generic 
regularities that are invisible to single-text common readers, with the help of corpus 
linguistics automated tools. 
An example of such generic regularities is the syntactic structure of a “prototypical” 
utterance, which has acquired a habitual use in this definite situation, besides being 
the support of fulfilling intrinsic grammatical functions. As such, the stereotyped form 
of those utterances are replicated by diverse university enunciators, from different 
horizons: accordingly, in Peircean terms, we might say that, as ‘dicent sinsigns’, they 
instantiate a particular expected and predictable ‘legisignic’ pattern. That is, in a typical 
conditional statement: if, as an utterer, I find myself in a communicative situation 
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whose purpose is the promotion of an academic institution, then I would have to say 
a, b and c in x, y and z ways, with the union of {a, b, c} and {x, y, z} being the predicted 
set of patterns emerging in all similar micro-situations. Such generic patterns include 
the overall use of the present tense (appropriate if one wishes to attribute existing 
and perennial features to an institution), of an impersonal style (as evidence of a 
constructed omniscient enunciator), of appositions (as descriptive pre-constructs of 
the subjects of numerous predications), of intrinsically positive adjectives (i.e. ‘strong’, 
‘prestigious’, ‘best’, etc.), of enumerations and numbers (to synthesize and numerically 
characterize the features a university can be associated with), of additive prepositions 
and adverbs, etc. 
Moreover, as far as the content is concerned, another type of regularity we found 
in the corpus is related to interdiscourses, understood as “the totality of discursive 
unities (belonging to previous discourses of a same speech genre, or to discourses 
contemporary to other speech genres, etc.) with which a particular discourse enters 
in an implicit or explicit relation” (Maingueneau 2009: 77; my translation, J. G.). A 
particular process of semiosis never begins ex nihilo; a sign at a t period is always 
interpreted as a determined response to an antecedent sign produced at a t-1 period. 
This unlimited, intertwining semiotic chain is what enables mutual understanding 
to happen between two sets of utterances, often belonging to different discourse 
genres or distant texts, dispersed in the continuous flows of semioses in which we 
are embedded. In our case, we suggest that the use of ‘excellence’ and ‘quality’, very 
frequent in those texts, instantiate intertextual references with specific antecedent 
political discourses concerning higher education in Europe. Here are three exemplary 
utterances employing the ‘excellence’ expression (my translation and emphasis, J. G.):
(1) The University of Luxembourg (UL), as a small-sized institution 
with a global outreach, aims at excellence in research and education. 
(text of the University of Luxembourg)
(2) All curricula prepared at the University of Poitiers rely on a quest 
of excellence. (text of the University of Poitiers)
(3) Besides its interdisciplinary training curriculum and the excellence 
of its research, Paris Descartes University is characterized by 
the richness of its history and that of its heritage. (Text of Paris 
Descartes University)2
2 Th e university websites from which the texts derive are those of the University of 
Luxembourg (http://wwwfr.uni.lu/universite/presentation/vision_mission/(language)/fre-FR), 
the University of Poitiers (archived at: http://composante-imedias.univ-poitiers.fr/la-diversite-
et-la-qualite-des-formations-11349.kjsp?RH=1182255816372) and Paris Descartes University 
(https://www.univ-paris5.fr/UNIVERSITE/Le-patrimoine), respectively. 
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It can be suggested that those expressions, as elements of an isotopy of “competition”, 
making sense in a particular sociopolitical context in which a certain number of 
emerging practices in universities (e.g. evaluation of research and education, elaborate 
partnerships with other so-called prestigious institutions and enterprises, changing 
trends in teaching methods, internationalization of recruitment, etc.) bring about the 
promotion of a competitive state of affairs in academia: universities in the corpus aim 
to show they are the best in their domain, suggesting they have a (hypothetical) role 
to play on a “competitive” international stage. Overall, then, the overarching context, 
coupled with the communication situation bringing about those texts, generate a 
habitual use of specific expressions that are highly frequent in the corpus and part of an 
instantiated promotional genre: as such, they become predictable patterns highlighted 
by the discursivist.
5. The scientific relevance of contextualized predictabilities
Now, it is important to stress again that the potential discursive predictabilities 
concerned here do not apply universally but are logically context-dependent: 
community speakers generate meaning through (complexes of) signs that always 
correspond to localized semiotic constructs they have been taught or driven to 
compose by habitual grounded experience. As Wittgenstein (1953) would have 
said, the ‘forms of life’ giving rise to ‘language games’ (Sprachspiele) are above all 
innumerable and subject to constant reappraisal. With that in mind, highlighting such 
localized instances of Thirdness can only be relevant as far as it draws attention to the 
universality of the semiotic process underlying them: it would indeed be quite in vain to 
compile vast and often useless data of discursive regularities without questioning their 
phenomenological raison d’être or without linking them with the more abstract process 
that triadically unites a Sign to its Object and Interpretant. The quest for Thirdness, 
or generalities, should ultimately lead to the epistemological acknowledgement of the 
“predictive power of semiotics” (Bouissac 2010: 100).
Moreover, highlighting the habit-regulated instances in our social life draws 
attention to the logic of Peirce’s so-called synechism, understood as the conception 
following which “the universe of reality is […] a continuum” (Gilmore 2006: 311). 
As far as the symbolic sign is concerned, which is traditionally conceived as a man-
made convention only, Nöth (2010: 84) points to the bridge Peirce’s synechism builds 
between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, traditionally viewed separately:
In contrast to [some] theories, which postulate that the symbol is the “essence 
of man” and of human culture (Cassirer), and which thus establish a strict 
separation, a semiotic threshold, between culture and nature according to the 
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presence or absence of symbols, Peirce’s much broader perspective of the symbol 
as a sign guided by onto- and phylogenetic habit serves as a synechistic bridge 
to overcome two dualisms which have prevailed in the history of semiotics, the 
dualism of culture vs. nature and the dualism of the conventional vs. the innate, 
i.e., between human signs culturally transmitted by teaching and learning and 
signs genetically inherited and interpreted by instinctive dispositions. Against the 
dualism culture vs. nature, Peirce proposes that the habit by which symbols are 
interpreted is conventional or natural. Against the dualism of the conventional 
vs. the innate, Peirce postulates that the habit which determines the symbol is an 
“acquired or inborn” disposition.
In Peirce’s mind, the habitual triadic process involved thus overarches ‘culture’ as well as 
‘nature’ in a synechistical fashion: as Nöth (2010: 92) claims, “the habit that determines 
a symbol to function as a sign may be acquired or inborn, but the habit as such is a 
phenomenon of nature” (my emphasis, J. G.). In this perspective, any localized analysis 
of Thirdness should be regarded as a testimony to the unity that Peirce’s philosophy 
ensures for both natural and human scientific inquiries, whose aim is:
[…] to transcend the perception of existent things and to see things, to understand 
things, in terms of their relations to one another in a kind of field. What you 
are understanding is not things in terms of the mechanical principles of action/
reaction, but the more general tendencies of things, the dispositions of things to 
interact in specific ways within a specific context.  (Gilmore 2006: 312) 
In our case, the particular “things” Gilmore refers to would be our discursive utterances 
as they are embedded “within a specific context”: they can indeed be apprehended as 
“things” or Seconds, understood as particulars in all their observable concreteness. In 
this endeavour to understanding “the general tendencies” of our discourses however, 
we semioticians need the global insight of philosophers – among whom Peirce is the 
most revered one – who can theoretically articulate, ground and make sense of the 
phenomenological foundation of our objects of study. As far as discourse is concerned, 
see for instance Bergman 2009 and his work on the underlying rhetorical aspects of 
Peirce’s theory of signs.
Conclusion
In this article, we wished to recall that a relative predictability of discursive patterns 
was theoretically and implicitly envisaged by Peirce’s paradigmatic conception of 
the nature of semiosis: the regularities one can detect in corpora of carefully chosen 
texts belonging to similar communication situations – or “forms of life” – point to 
semiotic habits evincing actualized Thirdness, according to Peirce’s terminology. Every 
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communication situation generates learnt semiotic constraints over-determining 
our individual discourse. If those generic constraints are not as crystallized as 
those regulating grammatical constructs, they nevertheless influence some general 
pertinent aspects of the formation of utterances. It follows that we could theoretically 
(and relatively) predict the actualization of probable detectable syntagms, but for 
contextualized settings only. However, considering the infinite heterogeneity of 
semiotic habits just one small community can produce, it would be in vain to try to 
describe the discursive patterns of all the semio-linguistic material that social actors 
leave behind. Nevertheless, the localized studies of those patterns would point to the 
crucial fact that semiotics, as a practice highlighting how the Real can have instantiated 
existence through meaning-making material (whether iconic, symbolic, etc.), is also a 
science of the real – in the most commonsensical, materialist sense of the term.
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Жанры дискурса как определители дискурсивных 
последовательностей: случай семиотической предсказуемости?
В статье изучаются дискурсивные последовательности, которые можно наблюдать 
в  корпусах текстов, основанных на сходных ситуациях коммуникации (медицинские 
интервью, политические дебаты, обучение и т.д.). Один тип такой последовательности 
связывают с так называемыми «жанрами дискурса», которые рассматриваются как 
инструкции, обрамляющие форму высказываний в данной дискурсивной практике. 
Эти последовательности выдвигают на первый план относительно отрегулированную, 
неслучайную природу большинства наших дискурсивных практик и характеризуют 
неизбежную ограниченность творческого потенциала значения в дискурсе. Мы полагаем, 
что пирсовские понятия первичности и привычки (habit) могут оказаться полезными 
при описании роли и важности таких последовательностей в социодискурсивной жизни. 
Более того – мы верим, что дискурсивные последовательности являются идеальным 
материалом при изучении предсказуемости в семиотических (дискурсивных) процессах. 
Их изучение может быть одним из многих исследовательских направлений, где могла бы 
быть  применена основанная на предсказуемости научная концепция семиотики.
Diskursusežanrid kui diskursiivsete korrapärasuste kindlaksmäärajad: 
kas semiootilise ennustatavuse juhtum?
Artikkel keskendub diskursiivsetele korrapärasustele, mida võib üldiselt täheldada sarnastes 
kommunikatsioonisituatsioonides (meditsiiniline küsitlemine, poliitilised debatid, õppetöö 
jne.) loodud tekstikorpustes. Üks seesuguste korrapärasuste tüüp on seotud niinimetatud 
“diskursusežanridega”, mida peetakse vaikimisi instruktsioonide kogumiks, mis laias laastus 
piiravad antud lausungite kuju diskursiivse praktika raames. Need korrapärasused toovad esile 
enamike meie diskursiivsete praktikate suhteliselt reguleeritud, mittejuhusliku olemuse ning 
näitavad kujukalt tähendusloome paratamatult piiratud loovust diskursuses. Sellest lähtudes 
pakume välja, et Charles Sanders Peirce’i poolt teoretiseeritud Kolmasuse ja harjumuse 
mõisted võivad osutuda kasulikuks selliste korrapärasuste rolli ning tähtsuse kirjeldamisel 
meie sotsiodiskursiivses elus. Konkreetsemalt usume, et diskursuse korrapärasused on 
ideaalsed juhtumiuuringuteks, kui soovitakse vaadelda ennustatavuse esinemist semiootilistes 
(diskursiivsetes) protsessides. Kokkuvõttes osutame, et nende uurimine võiks olla üks 
paljudest uurimissuundadest, mille kaudu saaks rakendada ennustamispõhist teaduslikku 
semiootikakontseptsiooni.
